Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to consider Paul Churchland's arguments for eliminative materialism and for the abolition of traditional epistemology. It is shown that these arguments are faulty and that there is more to be said for our commonsense conception of mentality than the eliminative materialist supposes. ;The essay begins by explaining the eliminative materialists' claim that our commonsense conception of mentality is an outmoded theory which will, or at least should, be replaced by a theory to be drawn from completed brain science. Drawing on contemporary work in metaphysics and the philosophy of science, it is shown that supervenience is an important intertheoretical relation which is not equivalent to reduction or elimination. Supervenience allows us to reconcile the claim that everything is physical with the claim that not all properties are expressible in the language of physics. ;Using this result, I argue that three of Churchland's four arguments for eliminative materialism rest on the dubious metaphysical assumption that all theories will either reduce to or be eliminated by completed physical science. It is shown that this failure is deeply ironic given Churchland's claim that disputes in the philosophy of mind are largely empirical in character. It is also shown, however, that eliminative materialists can easily respond to charges that their view is somehow self-referentially incoherent. ;It is shown that Churchland's fourth argument for eliminative materialism, and for the claim that traditional epistemology should be abolished, depends upon his first three arguments and is, therefore, flawed. It is also shown that the argument is a failure in its own right. The essay concludes by showing that there are some important respects in which our commonsense conception of mentality and traditional epistemology are superior to purely materialistic accounts. This superiority stems, in large part, from the availability of intentional states such as beliefs.