Intentional omissions

Noûs 44 (1):158-177 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ability and responsibility for omissions.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
Praise and prevention.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):47-61.
Being in the world.Joseph Raz - 2010 - Ratio 23 (4):433-452.
Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
How not to explain the errors of the immune system.Peter Melander - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):223-241.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-02-23

Downloads
239 (#85,034)

6 months
35 (#101,367)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Randolph Clarke
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Omissions as possibilities.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.
Harming by Failing to Benefit.Neil Feit - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):809-823.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.

View all 58 references / Add more references