Activation vectors versus propositional attitudes: How the brain represents reality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424 (1992)
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The united shades of eliminative materialism.Serdal Tümkaya - 2022 - Philosophical Forum 53 (2):95-113.
Truth, explanation, minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987–1009.

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