Abstract
It was one of Brentano’s central ideas that all judgements are at bottom existential. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint he tried to show how all traditionally acknowledged judgement forms could be reinterpreted as existential statements. Existential propositions, therefore, were a central concern for the whole Brentano School. Kazimierz Twardowski, who also accepted this program, introduced the problem of the existential reduction to his Polish students, but not all of them found this idea plausible. In 1911 Stanisław Leśniewski published a paper under the title “A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propositions”
where he criticised Brentano’s translation. According to Leśniewski
the consequences of Brentano’s program would be absurd because according
to Leśniewski all positive existential propositions are analytically
true and all negative ones are contradictory. In his later works Leśniewski
repudiated all his early writings (1911–1914) as philosophically immature
and formally imprecise. “[…] I regret that they have appeared in print,” he
writes, “and formally ‘repudiate’ them herewith […]”. But in spite of this severe assessment, these early papers are worth considering not only from a historical standpoint. As we will see, Leśniewski’s critique of Brentano is unsound, but it casts an interesting light on his understanding of certain basic metaphysical concepts.