Logic for Describing Strong Belief-Disagreement Between Agents

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Studia Logica 106 (1):35-47 (2018)
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Abstract

The result of an interaction is influenced by its epistemic state, and several epistemic notions are related to multiagent situations. Strong belief-disagreement on a certain proposition between agents means that one agent believes the proposition and the other believes its negation. This paper presents a logical system describing strong belief-disagreement between agents and demonstrates its soundness and completeness. The notion of belief-disagreement as well as belief-agreement can facilitate gaining a clearer understanding of the acts of trade and speech.

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10.1007/s11225-017-9724-1

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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Non-contingency.I. L. Humberstone - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):214-229.
Minimal Non-contingency Logic.Steven T. Kuhn - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):230-234.
Completeness and Definability in the Logic of Noncontingency.Evgeni E. Zolin - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):533-547.
The Modal Logic of Agreement and Noncontingency.Lloyd Humberstone - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):95-127.

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