The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | Vol 75, No 1

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1209-1233 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A leading idea of cultural evolutionary theory is that for human cultures to undergo evolutionary change, cultural transmission must generally serve as a high-fidelity copying process. In analogy to genetic inheritance, the high fidelity of human cultural transmission would act as a safeguard against the transformation and loss of cultural information, thus ensuring both the stability and longevity of cultural traditions. Cultural fidelity would also serve as the key difference-maker between human cumulative cultures and non-human non-cumulative traditions, explaining why only us humans, with our uniquely high-fidelity transmission capabilities, are capable of evolving and sustaining complex traditions. But what does it mean for cultural transmission to be more or less faithful? This article has two objectives. The first is to clarify the meaning and uses of the concept of cultural fidelity and to evaluate their explanatory import. I argue that cultural evolutionists use several fidelity concepts (episodic, propensity, and generalized fidelity), concepts that I will define and clarify. The second objective is to challenge the explanatory significance of a general notion of fidelity (generalized fidelity) as being both explanatorily meaningful and operationalizable. I conclude that if fidelity is to serve as an explanation of the key differences between human cumulative cultures and non-human non-cumulative traditions, then the concept will have to be redesigned and rely on different assumptions. 1Introduction 2Generalized Fidelity 2.1The need for an explanatory concept of fidelity 2.2Three conditions for a general notion of cultural fidelity 3Episodic Fidelity 3.1Measuring episodic fidelity 3.2The relevance problem 3.3Explanatory pluralism 3.4The incommensurability of fidelity metrics 4Propensity Fidelity 5Fidelity as an Explanatory Concept 5.1Explaining cultural stability 5.2Explaining human distinctiveness 6Conclusion.

Similar books and articles

The Case for Memes.Matt Gers - 2008 - Biological Theory 3 (4):305-315.
Darwinian cultural evolution rivals genetic evolution.Mark Pagel - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):360-360.
Imitation, emulation, and the transmission of culture.Andrew Whiten - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):39-40.
How Traditions Live and Die.Olivier Morin - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
The Value of Fidelity in Adaptation.James Harold - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (1):89-100.
Memes revisited.Kim Sterelny - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):145-165.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-07-25

Downloads
67 (#245,024)

6 months
41 (#97,394)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mathieu Charbonneau
Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Citations of this work

Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Cultural evolution.Tim Lewens - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Natural selection and the reference grain problem.Pierrick Bourrat - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 80:1-8.
Culture and cognitive science.Jesse Prinz - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations