The Limits of Computational Psychology in J. Fodor

In Wenceslao J. González (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Causality and Psychological Subject: New Reflections on James Woodward’s Contribution. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 221-242 (2018)
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