Three kinds of the Lotka–Volterra model transfer from biology to economics

Synthese 202 (4):1-22 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers of science regard the Lotka–Volterra model as an exemplar of model transfer across disciplines. This article traces three cases of the Lotka–Volterra model transfer to economics during the 1960–70s. Each model represents a different kind of methodological attitude towards model transfer. After detailing the historical case studies where the Lotka–Volterra model was transferred to economics and how the economists actually adopted it into their model constructions, the following philosophical discussions on interpretation and justification suggest that formal template or structure alone does not produce successful transdomain model transfer; rather it is subject to the model builders’ intentions and interpretation. In addition to interdisciplinary transfer, intradisciplinarity is also crucial to how models are constructed in order to be resituated in their economic context.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Modelling as Indirect Representation? The Lotka–Volterra Model Revisited.Tarja Knuuttila & Andrea Loettgers - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1007-1036.
On the Contribution of Volterra and Lotka to the Development of Modern Biomathematics.Giorgio Israel - 1988 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 10 (1):37 - 49.
Modeling causal structures: Volterra’s struggle and Darwin’s success.Raphael Scholl & Tim Räz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):115-132.
Transfer and templates in scientific modelling.Wybo Houkes & Sjoerd D. Zwart - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 77:93-100.
Model Organisms are Not (Theoretical) Models.Arnon Levy & Adrian Currie - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):327-348.
Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations.Holly Andersen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):485-508.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-17

Downloads
16 (#911,480)

6 months
16 (#161,060)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references