Abstract

This chapter critiques the notion of identity, a philosophical reaction in the Quinean sense that vindicates another significant hypothesis, which is called the “No entity without identity” theorem. Here, the identification of an entity relies upon its identity. The first segment of this chapter revisits the following question: How do we encounter the concept of a subjective “mind”? Could we “infer” or “experience” the concept of “mind” in our daily lives? Every entity has some characteristics that prompt comparison with similar entities. Although I think that other minds have a subjective periphery and that other minds have an objective periphery lurking behind this (privileged access), we can construe the relationship in a subjective way (individual mind). In the second section of the chapter, I address a different point by considering why the idea of “other minds” causes philosophical dilemmas. Can “other minds” exist as a substance in one’s own mind? The category of human knowledge encompasses the reality of minds and other minds. The other minds remain an accompanying part of the individual mind since the expression, belief, and mental content of the individual mind merge in the linguistic expression in a split manner that we may ascribe as privileged access (subjective incorrigible knowledge) and corrigible knowledge. But I think that the relation between minds and other minds sounds especially idiosyncratic in its own identity. Despite becoming diverse, the individual mind can still be intimate by blending and attunement between the subjective and objective dichotomy.