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Actuality and knowability
Analysis 71 (3):411-419 (2011)
Abstract
It is widely believed that for all p, or at least for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that (p iff actually p). It is even more widely believed that for all such p, it is knowable that (p iff actually p). There is a simple argument against these claims from four antecedently plausible premises.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
Two-dimensional semantics and the nesting problem.David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):210-224.
References found in this work
Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
Languages of possibility: an essay in philosophical logic.Graeme Forbes - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
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