Why We Should Reject Semiretributivism and Be Skeptics about Basic Desert Moral Responsibility in advance

The Harvard Review of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

John Martin Fischer has recently critiqued the skeptical view that no one is ever morally responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense and has defended a view he calls semiretributivism. This paper responds to Fischer’s concerns about the skeptical perspective, especially those regarding victims’ rights, and further explains why we should reject his semiretributivism. After briefly summarizing the Pereboom/Caruso view and Fischer’s objections to it, the paper argues that Fischer’s defense of basic desert moral responsibility is too weak to justify the kind of retributive blame and punishment he wishes to preserve. It then turns to the issue of victims’ rights and argues that Fischer is mistaken that victims want retribution above all else, and that the public health-quarantine model is better able to deal with the concerns of victims. It concludes by offering two additional objections to Fischer’s semiretributivism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free Will Skeptics Can Have Their Basic Desert and Eat It Too.Leigh Vicens - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1:1-12.
Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derk Pereboom.
Basically Deserved Blame and its Value.Michael McKenna - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3).
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism.John Martin Fischer - forthcoming - The Harvard Review of Philosophy.
Persons, punishment, and free will skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
Revisionism, libertarianism, and naturalistic plausibility.Michael Robinson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2651-2658.
Revisionism, libertarianism, and naturalistic plausibility.Kevin Timpe - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2651-2658.
The Trilemma of Desert.Stephen Kershnar - 2006 - Public Affairs Quarterly 20 (3):219-233.
Merit, fit, and basic desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.
What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?Derk Pereboom - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):257-264.
Responsibility, Desert, and Justice.Carl Knight - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and distributive justice. Oxford University Press UK.
Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame.Seth Shabo - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):158-186.
Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism.Linda Radzik - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):161-173.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-26

Downloads
19 (#796,059)

6 months
19 (#134,285)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gregg D. Caruso
Corning Community College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references