Abstract

Supervaluationism holds that the future is undetermined, and as a consequence of this, statements about the future may be neither true nor false. In the present paper, we explore the novel and quite different view that the future is abundant: statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but may instead be glutty, that is both true and false. We will show that the logic resulting from this “abundance of the future” is a non-adjunctive paraconsistent formalism based on subvaluations, which has the virtue that all classical laws are valid in it, while no formula like φ ∧ ¬φ is satisfiable ; The peculiar behaviour of abundant logical consequence has an illuminating analogy in probability logic; abundance preserves some important features of classical logic when it comes to express those important retrogradations of truth which are presupposed by the argument de praesenti ad praeteritum.