Abstract
The author analyses the sense of virtue at the very heart of Kantian ethical formalism. First, he verifies the difficulty of placing Kantian ethics in one of the three models developed in the history of Western ethics – prescriptive, intentional and virtue ethics –, insofar as Kant places in the centre of moral analysis the notion of “imperative” (a precept), whose function is to show the purity of the “intention” as the only moral value, which deploys in a doctrine of virtue. Then, he studies the “character” as the metaphysical foundation of Kantian ethics throughout the changes that the account of the relationships between the intelligible and the sensible character from the Critique of Pure Reason to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason suffers in order to show that the doctrine of virtue finds its place in the context of ethic formalism, precisely in the frame of the Kantian conception of moral revolution as an incessant task and progress. In this way, virtue, as a quality of the character, is defined as a moral force of the human will in the compliance of duty.