Abstract

This dissertation traces the development of Hegel's critique of morality from his early religious writings and the later Jena texts through the mature critique that is found in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Since Hegel's critique is directed primarily against the moral philosophy of Kant, the dissertation commences with a consideration of certain problems that emerge out of Kant's endeavor to provide a rational foundation for morality. These problems are evaluated independently of Hegel's critique, and this evaluation is adverted to in the sequel where Hegel's own critique is thematically addressed. ;The argument of the dissertation is governed by a distinction between the objective and subjective conditions of morality, namely, transcendent moral law and radical moral freedom respectively. Hegel's critique is interpreted as a two pronged assault on these two principles. The assault on the objective condition of morality attempts to show that the legislation of pure practical reason reduces to an empty "formalism" that provides no guidance for concrete action in the real world. The assault on the subjective condition of morality attempts to show that purity of the will cannot make duty for duty's sake its determining ground, and hence that radical moral freedom of the kind that Kant envisioned is an illusion. The final chapter of the dissertation considers the Aufhebung of morality that Hegel presents in the Philosophy of Right. ;The investigation into Hegel's critique of morality comes to the conclusion that neither the assault on the objective condition of morality nor that on the subjective condition is successful. Hegel demonstrates neither that the legislation of pure practical reason reduces to an empty formalism nor that it is impossible for the will to make duty for duty's sake its determining ground. Because a critique of morality is indispensable to Hegel's case for the possibility of "absolute knowledge" and, in particular, for his attempt to justify philosophy as a way of life superior to the way of religious faith, the failure of this critique calls into question his entire philosophic venture