Degrees of Assertability

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49 (2020)
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Abstract

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 19-49, January 2022.

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2022

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10.1111/phpr.12725

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Sam Carter
Rutgers - New Brunswick (PhD)

Citations of this work

Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.
Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.

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