Abstract

This Critical Notice deals with two recent books that report the findings of statistical analyses of Supreme Court of Canada judgments over extensive periods of time. The authors of both studies argue that empirical analysis can make significant contributions to theories of law and the understanding of what high court judges do, and in fact, that theoretical approaches on their own are necessarily inadequate to this task. The review questions whether the studies succeed in meeting the ambitions set for them. InAttitudinal Decision-making in the Supreme Court of Canada, Ostberg and Wetstein fail to establish that the attitudinal model of jurisprudence developed by American political science provides a strong explanation of the performance of the Supreme Court of Canada. In The Empirical Gap in Jurisprudence, Daved Muttart employs such broadly stated measures of judicial reasoning that his conclusions about the Court’s performance remain general in nature and do not pose serious challenges to the major, competing schools of jurisprudential thought he seeks to examine. Both studies fall back on unconvincing arguments about the prevalence of judicial activism in Supreme Court decision-making in the absence of stronger findings on their principal themes