Created, Changeable, and Yet Acausal?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):325-334 (2019)
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Abstract

Amongst the entities that have been created by human agents, and can be changed by human agents, besides concrete particulars, such as tables and chairs, our intuitions suggest that there are repeatables—entities that can each have multiple concrete instances. And since there is reason to think that repeatables are acausal, there is reason to think that that there are entities that are created, changeable, repeatable and acausal. Then again, it might be supposed that if an entity is created then it is causal, and that if an entity is changed then it is causal. It is argued here that these suppositions are insufficiently motivated to undermine the case for the existence of entities that are created, changeable, repeatable and acausal.

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Vanessa Carr
University College London

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References found in this work

Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Two concepts of causation.Ned Hall - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 225-276.
Theories of Location.Josh Parsons - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-232.
What a musical work is.Jerrold Levinson - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):5-28.

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