Dreyfus is right: knowledge-that limits your skill

Synthese 202 (3):1-69 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Skilful expertise is grounded in practical, performative knowledge-how, not in detached, spectatorial knowledge-that, and knowledge-how is embodied by habitual dispositions, not representation of facts and rules. Consequently, as action control is a key requirement for the intelligent selection, initiation, and regulation of skilful performance, habitual action control, i.e. the kind of action control based on habitual dispositions, is the true hallmark of skill and the only veridical criterion to evaluate expertise. Not only does this imply that knowledge-that does not make your actions more skilful, but it also implies that it makes them less skilful. This thesis, that I call Radical Habitualism, finds a precursor in Hubert Dreyfus. His approach is considered extreme by most philosophers of skill & expertise: an agent –says Dreyfus– does not perform like an expert when they lack the embodied dispositions necessary to control their action habitually or when they stop relying on such dispositions to control their actions. Thus, one cannot perform skilfully if their actions are guided by representations (isomorphic schemas, explicit rules, and contentful instructions), as the know-that that they convey disrupts or diminishes the agent’s habitual engagement with the task at hand. In defence of Radical Habitualism, I will argue that only the contentless know-how embedded in habitual dispositions fulfils (i) the genetic, (ii) the normative, and (iii) the epistemic requirements of skilful performance. I will examine the phenomenological premises supporting Dreyfus’ approach, clarify their significance for a satisfactory normative and explanatory account of skilful expertise, and rebut the most common objections raised by both intellectualists and conciliatory habitualists, concerning hybrid actions guided by a mix of habitual and representational forms of control. In revisiting Dreyfus anti-representationalist approach, I will particularly focus on its epistemological implications, de-emphasizing other considerations related to conscious awareness.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Skill of Virtue.Matthew Stichter - 2007 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (2):39-49.
Knowing More than We Can Tell.William Hasselberger - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):775-803.
Skill and knowledge.Ernest Sosa & Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 146-156.
Knowing More than We Can Tell.William Hasselberger - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):775-803.
Interactional expertise as a third kind of knowledge.Harry Collins - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):125-143.
Methods, minds, memory, and kinds.Alison Springle - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):635-661.
Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.
Tacit Knowledge Meets Analytic Kantianism.Stephen Turner - 2014 - Tradition and Discovery 41 (1):33-47.
Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress.Brian Weatherson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):370-386.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-02

Downloads
21 (#743,384)

6 months
15 (#174,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Massimiliano Cappuccio
University of New South Wales

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references