Abstract

This dissertation undertakes the twofold task interpreting Aristotle's account of the nature of life and evaluating that account in light of the findings of contemporary science and philosophy of biology. I argue that Aristotle defines being alive teleologically: a is alive just in case a possesses intrinsic teleological directedness. Further, this account of life reveals itself to be philosophically astute and scientifically sound. ;The dissertation's central chapters defend these general theses in both scholarly and contemporary contexts. Given the central place of teleology in the analysans of life, chapters three and four investigate Aristotle's commitments concerning teleology. I argue that Aristotle has moderate, plausible and strong reasons for being a realist about teleological commitment, that the scope of his commitment to teleology is compatible with his defining life teleologically, and that his conception of the final cause is nonreductive; teleology is, for Aristotle, a sui generis unreduced causal factor in the structure of the natural world. ;This interpretation of Aristotle's ontic commitments vis-a-vis teleology raises serious doubt concerning the contemporary adequacy of his view. I argue that these doubts are unfounded. I argue in chapter five that the presumptive contemporary reductivist account of teleology fails to provide an adequate theoretical definition of teleology. Chapter six argues that the failure of the best reductive account does not support eliminitivism concerning teleology for two reasons. First, common objections to Aristotelian teleology are ill-founded. Second, we have strong evidence from quantum mechanics that the ontology of the physical world is---contrary to popular presupposition---congenial to the postulation of sui generis Aristotelian teleology. If we accept the ontic authority of science rather the modern presupposition that sui generis teleology is ontically or methodologically unacceptable in a scientific conception of the world, then Aristotle's commitments reveal themselves to be, again, plausible, moderate and sophisticated. ;With foundational work on the definition's central notion completed, chapter seven returns to the exegetical task of uncovering the details of Aristotle's account of life. The result indicates that Aristotle possessed a philosophically sophisticated and defensible conception of life even in contemporary terms; Aristotle's account of life deserves serious contemporary consideration