Can Inconsistency Be Reasonable?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):245 - 270 (1981)
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Abstract

We cannot know something unless it is true. The things that we know, therefore, must be logically consistent. Moreover, we cannot know something unless we are justified in believing it. But it does not obviously follow that the things that we are justified in believing must be consistent with each other. For we can be justified in believing something that turns out to be false. Knowledge entails truth and hence consistency. Rationally justified belief does not entail truth and it may not entail consistency.Knowledge, however, requires especially good justification. We can have reason to believe something that happens to be true, even good reason, without our belief being so well-grounded that we know it to be true.

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Citations of this work

Inconsistency and scientific reasoning.Joel M. Smith - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):429-445.
Inconsistency and scientific reasoning.Joel M. Smith - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):429-445.
Frames, knowledge, and inference.Paul R. Thagard - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):233 - 259.
The essential tension.Marta Fehér - 1990 - Studies in East European Thought 39 (3-4):231-239.

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References found in this work

Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.
Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.
Set Theory and Its Logic.J. C. Shepherdson & Willard Van Orman Quine - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):371.
Set Theory and Its Logic.Joseph S. Ullian & Willard Van Orman Quine - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):383.
Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1977 - Noûs 11 (4):431-437.

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