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Chalmers on epistemic content
Abstract
1. Let us say that a thought is _about an object _o just in case the truth value of the thought at any possible world W depends on how things are with _o_ in W. Thus the thought that the first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist is not about Bismark, because that thought is true in a world W iff, in W, whoever happens to be the first Chancellor was an astute diplomatist, and that may well not be Bismark. On Russell.Author's Profile
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Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.Berit Brogaard - 1972 - In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy). Wiley-Blackwell.
The components of content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
The rationalist foundations of Chalmers's 2-d semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):227-255.
Mental content and the division of epistemic labour.Christopher Gauker - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):302-18.
On Chalmers' "principle of organizational invariance" and his "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" thought experiments.William J. Greenberg - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):53-58.
Perception, generality, and reasons.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131--57.
On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
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