Abstract

This dissertation explores several related themes from the second Chapter of Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. A particular focus is Kant's view of the moral law as a law of reason and the similarities between this view and the position of the natural lawyers. My first chapter summarizes and interprets the conception of morality found in four leading natural law theorists--Cicero, Aquinas, Suarez and Grotius--which provides the basis for some preliminary comparisons with Kant. Chapter 2 examines the opening paragraphs of Groundwork II, where I argue against Reich's well-known thesis that Groundwork II was directly inspired by Cicero. Also, through an analysis of Kant's admonitions regarding the use of examples in moral philosophy, I contend that these opening paragraphs are more central to the main argument of the Chapter than is often appreciated. Chapter 3 approaches Kant's ethical rationalism by discussing the role of Ideas in Kant's moral philosophy. Particular attention is paid to the moral conception of the Inaugural Dissertation and first Critique, in order to show continuity in the development of Kant's moral thought. Chapter 4 reconstructs the early stages of the main argument of Chapter II, highlighting the distinctions Kant draws between objective principles, maxims and the moral law. I offer a detailed interpretation of Kant's claim that the fundamental principle of morality is an a priori synthetic proposition. In Chapter 5, I consider how Kant arrives at the various formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Special attention is paid to the sense in which all of the formulations are formal principles. I offer an analogy between the differing emphases in the formulations and what the natural lawyers regarded as conceptual conditions necessary for a law to be valid as law. This comparison provides an illuminating perspective on the relationship of the formulations to each other and to the moral law, and helps to undermine prevalent views about what the formulations mean and how Kant arrives at them