The Validity of the Argument from Inductive Risk

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):187-190 (2023)
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Abstract

Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument invalid. This flaw is superficial, and a small amendment to it rescues the claim of validity.

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Author Profiles

Matthew J. Brown
Southern Illinois University - Carbondale
Jacob Stegenga
Cambridge University

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References found in this work

The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Sisyphean Science: Why Value Freedom is Worth Pursuing.Tarun Menon & Jacob Stegenga - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (48):1-24.

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