Microgenetic Theory of Perception, Memory, and the Mental State: A Brief Review

Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):52-70 (2017)
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Abstract

For over a century and certainly since single-unit recordings in the 1960s the theory of perception that has dominated thinking and research, with implications for the understanding of all other cognitive domains, entails a neocortical process of progressive assembly from V-1 to V-4 leading to object-construction and secondary spatial updating and recognition. In recent years, however, difficulties with the theory have emerged in neurophysiological research though a compelling alternative has not been forcefully argued. It is the purpose of this paper to review the main features of the microgenetic account of perception, which inverts standard theory 180 degrees, and aligns the perceptual process with patterns of evolutionary growth. This theory developed on clinical study, and perhaps for this reason has not received sufficient attention, in mainstream cognitive and affective neuroscience, though it provides an account not only of perception but of stages in memory, imagery, the present moment, and the mind/brain state.

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Process Metaphysics of Consciousness.Robert Prentner - 2018 - Open Philosophy 1 (1):3-13.

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