Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning

In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)
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Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
I—Elizabeth Fricker: Stating and Insinuating.Elizabeth Fricker - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.

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