Regulative Principles and Kinds of the Unconditioned

Kantian Review 26 (2):287-297 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his Kant on Laws, Eric Watkins presents an account of reason on which the principles of specification and continuity are regulative instructions to search for different kinds of the unconditioned. I suggest that we correct Watkins’ account in two ways. First, we need to complete Watkins’ claim to the plurality of the unconditioned: reason aims for three kinds of the unconditioned, associated with the lowest, next and highest concepts. Second, we need to look beyond reason’s search for the unconditioned in order to properly understand the nature of the aim of reason. I argue that we construe reason’s aim as the systematic unity of cognition considered as a whole or, in Kant’s teleological terms, as the realization of an ‘idea’, or a ‘purposive unity’.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kant on materialism.Eric Watkins - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (5):1035-1052.
The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment.Ina Goy - 2015 - Studi Kantiani 28:65-88.
The Unity of Reason. [REVIEW]Richard Velkley - 1996 - Review of Metaphysics 49 (3):668-670.
The unity of reason: rereading Kant.Susan Neiman - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Regulative Role of the Ideas and Principles of Reason in Kant's Philosophy.Seied Masud Sief - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 1 (202):77-88.
The Ideas of Reason.Robert R. Ehman - 1961 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):225 - 235.
Kant's account of nature's systematicity and the unity of theoretical and practical reason.Lara Ostaric - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):155 – 178.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-16

Downloads
42 (#381,901)

6 months
13 (#203,334)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Angela Breitenbach
Cambridge University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references