Natural law, motives, and freedom of the will

Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):246–261 (2001)
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Abstract

In this paper I piece together a Wittegnsteinian view of the topics indicated in my title, contrasting it with the views of Bertrand Russell and Donald Davidson ‐ two philosophers who, in words from the Blue Book, seem “constantly to see the method of science before their eyes.” I conclude that Wittegnstein helps us understand something those philosphers tend to overlook: that “freedom of the will” gets its meaning not in a belief to be assessed by evidence but, on the contrary, in the expression of a way of living and assessing life that limits the role of “assessing beliefs by evidence.”

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