Abstract

I argue that one cannot evaluate utilitarianism as a theory of right independently from a theory of good. Criticisms of utilitarianism have been popular recently. I contend, however, that the problem lies not with the basic utilitarian principle--an action is right to perform in a given situation if no alternative action would produce more good--but with the theories of good or lack thereof espoused by many utilitarians. I consider several traditional versions of utilitarianism which employ hedonistic, desire-satisfaction, or subjective theories of good and suggest particular cases in which these theories yield unacceptable normative conclusions. ;I argue for a version of ideal utilitarianism. Ideal utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism which states, minimally, that pleasure or the satisfaction of desire is not the only good. Though G. E. Moore's ideal utilitarian theory is widely admired, he does not say enough about what sorts of things are good. Hastings Rashdall, a less well known ideal utilitarian, discusses sorts of goods much more extensively. I both criticize and borrow from Moore and Rashdall in the course of presenting a new ideal utilitarian theory. ;I argue that each person has moral intuitions of the good. We intuit what things and kinds of things are good. I maintain that actions themselves can have intrinsic value and that the intrinsic value of actions ought to play an important part in ethical decision making. Each action must be viewed as part of a complete life. I also consider problems relating to knowledge of the consequences of actions. ;Bernard Williams, Samuel Scheffler, Stuart Hampshire, Philippa Foot, and others have recently presented criticisms of utilitarianism. I argue that some of these objections do not apply to an ideal utilitarian view with an objective theory of goodness. I show how the intrinsic value of actions and our lack of knowledge about future consequences affect decisions in particular cases. The unpalatable decisions the critics claim that utilitarianism mandates are at worst very rare cases for ideal utilitarianism. ;In the Conclusion I discuss what can be meant by "utilitarianism". My utilitarianism, though not strictly consequentialist, is teleological