On Chomskyan mentalism: A reply to Peter Slezak

Synthese 53 (1):123 - 141 (1982)
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Abstract

Introducing his paper, Slezak (p. 428) proposes “to examine Botha's criticisms in detail with a view to demonstrating that they are without foundation and are based on the most fundamental misunderstandings”. Concluding his paper, Slezak (p. 439) expresses the hope that he has shown “that the conceptions on which these criticisms rest are so seriously flawed as to make it unprofitable to attempt to unravel the rest of his analysis”. These formulations, by all standards, represent rather strong rhetoric. But, as the preceding paragraphs have shown, Slezak's discussion sadly lacks the relevant and accurate analyses needed to give substance to his rhetoric

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Computational commitment and physical realization.Robert M. Harrish - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):408-409.
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References found in this work

Rules and representations.Noam A. Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Artificial intelligence—A personal view.David Marr - 1977 - Artificial Intelligence 9 (September):37-48.
Rules and Representations.Noam Chomsky - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (1):88-89.
Three myths of computer science.James H. Moor - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):213-222.

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