Wittgenstein on Meaning, Use and Linguistic Commitment
Abstract
The idea of ‘committing oneself’ or ‘being committed’ by the use of language, or ‘linguistic commitment’, occurs in Wittgenstein’s notebooks and lectures from the end of 1930 together with remarks characteristic of this period, such as those on language as a system, and early reflections on other themes that would assume more importance in later years, such as rule-following and meaning as use. This paper examines the nature and contours of the concept of linguistic commitment (as well as some cognate concepts),with a focus on the question why Wittgenstein temporarily insisted on the concept, but rapidly abandoned it. In doing so, I aim to shed light on some features of Wittgenstein’s middle period, both in their own right and in their relationship to later reflections. One aspect that will emerge is that, contrary to what is normally believed, pragmatic and even pragmatist themes began to play a role in his thought as early as 1930.