Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise

Philosophical Studies 151 (3):413-419 (2010)
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Abstract

I argue that self-ascribed anti-expertise, taking our own beliefs to be false, is not always irrational.

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Citations of this work

Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Modesty and Humility.Nicolas Bommarito - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-19.

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References found in this work

I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.Andy Egan & Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.
Epistemic Self-respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
Anti-expertise, instability, and rational choice.Roy Sorensen - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):301 – 315.

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