On the Structure of Consciousness: Experiential swaths within holism

Stance 15:56-66 (2022)
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Abstract

Some views of holism fail to fully encapsulate the structure and independence of consciousness while others are reductionist in their insistence on a strict structure. After examining holism and mental state consciousness, I move to my own proposal for the structure of consciousness: experiential swaths. By highlighting the phenomenal interdependence of some aspects of consciousness without conceding that all aspects are so strongly intertwined, experiential swaths allow for further conceptual structurization within consciousness.

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Phenomenal Holism.Barry Dainton - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:113-139.

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