The Edinburgh School After Forty Years: Its Philosophical Presuppositions And Its Methodology Of Science

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 5 (1):27-47 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper is an attempt toward a systematic presentation of the theoretical standpoint of the “strong programme in the sociology of knowledge”, as delineated by David Bloor and Barry Barnes, after forty years of its functioning in the contemporary philosophical debates. The authoresses’ aim is to assess the programme of the “the Edinburgh School”, its reception and its development as a coherent naturalistic project. She views it as a comprehensive programme aimed to study the human cognition in each and every of its dimensions: individualistic and collective; biological and psychological; sociological and scientific. She claims that despite the unmistakable materialistic assumptions of “the Edinburgh School”, its programme should not be interpreted as a species of a “sociological reductionism”. She also underlines the most important elements of a consistent anti-essentialism inscribed in the theoretical approach of the British sociologists. Various consequences of the Duhem-Quine’s thesis, accepted by the representatives of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge, are also discussed and analyzed.Key words DAVID BLOOR, BARRY BARNES, SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,758

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A critique of relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge.Si Sun - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):115-130.
Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Edward Manier - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197-207.
The "strong programme", normativity, and social causes.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):1–22.
Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor, Flew, and Frege.Timm Triplett - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):439-450.
Bloor's bluff: Behaviourism and the strong programme.Peter Slezak - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
Conventionalism, scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge.Angelo M. Petroni - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225-240.
The Strong Programme.Finn Collin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:43-49.
Epistemology in the face of strong sociology of knowledge.James Maffie - 1999 - History of the Human Sciences 12 (4):21-40.
The strong programme for the sociology of science, reflexivity and relativism.Robert Nola - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):273 – 296.
The underdetermination of theory by data and the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge.Samir Okasha - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
Toward a monistic theory of science: The `strong programme' reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.
Can relativism be reconciled with realism and causalism?Barbara Tuchańska - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-31

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ewa Bińczyk
Nicolaus Copernicus University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references