Two Sources of Normativity in Enthusiastic Accounts of Kinds

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (1):127-152 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent trends in the debate about natural kinds tend towards increasingly permissive and practice-oriented views. I argue that while these accounts—which I characterize using Boyd’s ([1991]) term ‘enthusiasm’—offer several helpful insights, they often lack the normative force that they want to have; that is, they cannot provide an account of what makes something a good or bad, better or worse, kind for scientific pursuits. I argue that such accounts can regain a minimal sense of normativity in two ways. The first, which has already been widely embraced by theorists, is to index the appropriateness of a scientific kind to the domain within which it is situated. While this is a good solution, it is not clear how it can be applied in interdisciplinary and cross-domain research pursuits, which are increasingly common. The second way of regaining normativity—which is especially, but not exclusively, effective for such cross-domain pursuits—is to attend to the stage at which scientific research is occurring.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Search for the source. [REVIEW]Michael Smith - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384–394.
Norms of judgement, naturalism, and normativism about content.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):48-58.
Nature, value, and normativity: An introduction.Mario De Caro & Gabriele De Anna - 2020 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (2):113-114.
The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
Epistemological objections to materialism.Robert C. Koons - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 281--306.
Amorphic kinds: Cluster’s last stand?Neil E. Williams - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (1-2):14.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-05-04

Downloads
35 (#469,136)

6 months
10 (#306,562)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Riana Betzler
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Two approaches to natural kinds.Judith K. Crane - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12177-12198.
How the case against empathy overreaches.Riana J. Betzler - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 45 references / Add more references