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Revisiting the argument from fetal potential
Abstract
One of the most famous, and most derided, arguments against the morality of abortion is the argument from potential, which maintains that the fetus' potential to become a person and enjoy the valuable life common to persons, entails that its destruction is prima facie morally impermissible. In this paper, I will revisit and offer a defense of the argument from potentialAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Argument from Potentiality in the Embryo Protection Debate: Finally “Depotentialized”?Marco Stier & Bettina Schoene-Seifert - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):19-27.
Metaphysics and the Future-Like-Ours Argument Against Abortion.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):419-434.
Abortion and the Argument from Potential: What We Owe to the Ones Who Might Exist.A. Giubilini - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):49-59.
Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.Ana M. Pereira Daoud, Wybo J. Dondorp, Annelien L. Bredenoord & Guido M. W. R. De Wert - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (1):37-48.
Una clasificación de las teorías éticas sobre el aborto.David Alvargonzález - 2023 - Pensamiento 79 (303):493-516.
References found in this work
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Susan J. Armstrong & Richard George Botzler.
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