Abstract

Despite its recent prominence in the epistemological literature, the internalism-externalism debate is mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of the IE debate, one which fits well with the more entrenched views on the IE distinction and illuminates the fundamental issues on which internalists and externalists disagree. I argue that the debate should be construed in terms of warrant and not, as is usual, in terms of epistemic justification. And I note that there is an internal condition that many externalists think is necessary for warrant. That condition is the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by S's belief B if and only if S does not believe B is defeated. I conclude that internalism is the view that at least one internal condition other than NDC is necessary for warrant and that externalism is the denial of internalism. Strong externalists think that no internal conditions are necessary for warrant; moderate externalists allow that NDC is. ;Then, because of the central role played by NDC in my account of the IE debate , I develop a theory of defeat. I argue that defeat is connected with the absence of a highly subjective sort of rationality and that defeaters, like reasons, can be experiences as well as beliefs. I also explain how the internal sort of defeat I focus on is connected with the external sort that plays a role in defeasibility accounts of knowledge. ;I conclude by defending moderate externalism. I first give reasons for thinking that an internal version of NDC is necessary for warrant; this is enough to show that strong externalism is false. Then I argue that the most plausible defense of internalism--that access to the ground of one's belief is necessary for warrant--fails: either the access to grounds in question is not sufficiently internalistic or it is not necessary for warrant