Why general relativity does need an interpretation

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):88 (1996)
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Abstract

There is a widespread impression that General Relativity, unlike Quantum Mechanics, is in no need of an interpretation. I present two reasons for thinking that this is a mistake. The first is the familiar hole argument. I argue that certain skeptical responses to this argument are too hasty in dismissing it as being irrelevant to the interpretative enterprise. My second reason is that interpretative questions about General Relativity are central to the search for a quantum theory of gravity. I illustrate this claim by examining the interpretative consequences of a particular technical move in canonical quantum gravity.

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2009-01-28

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Gordon Belot
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Substantivalism, Relationism, and Structural Spacetime Realism.Mauro Dorato - 2000 - Foundations of Physics 30 (10):1605-1628.
The analysis of singular spacetimes.Erik Curiel - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):145.
Rehabilitating relationalism.Gordon Belot - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1):35 – 52.
On the Existence of Spacetime Structure.Erik Curiel - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw014.
A new spin on the hole argument.Dean Rickles - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (3):415-434.

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References found in this work

What price spacetime substantivalism? The hole story.John Earman & John Norton - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
The hole truth.Jeremy Butterfield - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):1-28.
Substances and space-time: What Aristotle would have said to Einstein.Tim Maudlin - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (4):531-561.
Mach's principle and the structure of dynamical theories.Julian B. Barbour & Bruno Bertotti - 1982 - Proceedings of the Royal Society, London:295--306.
The lessons of the hole argument.Robert Rynasiewicz - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):407-436.

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