Abstract

Several reasons purporting to explain why children should not have rights have been proposed within the philosophical literature. Among the more troubling of these comes from rights theorists who argue that any beings not capable of free and rational moral action are not properly right-holders. This proposal is most disconcerting since it denies rights for children tout court, where others might only restrict the scope or weight of rights children are permitted to have. ;I argue that this concern rests on a mistakenly narrow and inaccurately conception of rights: that the primary function of rights is to secure the will of the right-holder over the will of others. In place of this view, I propose a broader more inclusive concept of rights that is multifunctional. The necessary and sufficient feature of rights, on this conception, is a high-priority claim which imposes mandatory duties on specifiable others. ;Using this concept, I argue that children have both protective rights and liberty or self-determination rights. These rights are grounded in children's interests in being protected from specifically child-related threats and harms--among which are exploitation, neglect, abuse, and denial of opportunity. I employ the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as an exemplary list of rights for children. In making the case that children have liberty rights, I explore the right to play as a liberty grounded in important developmental interests typical of children. I argue that preparation for a morally autonomous and responsible adult life requires that children be secured age-appropriate liberties, choices, and control over certain aspects of their lives. Further, securing children some liberties supports and advances children's interests in protection and provision. ;I conclude that the language of rights is appropriate to children as among the principal normative means for ensuring their important interests and needs are met