Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox

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Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK (2003)
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Abstract

Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures in the field offer new thoughts and arguments about the paradoxes.

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Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame

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