Epistemic self-indulgence

In Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 215–235 (2010)
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle on Moral Temperance, Self‐Indulgence, and Insensibility Epistemic Temperance, Self‐Indulgence, and Insensibility Acknowledgments References.

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Heather Battaly
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