What Kind of Justice Corresponds to Democracy?

Synthesis Philosophica 21 (2):431-459 (2006)
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Abstract

Within the framework of the contemporary discussions of the presuppositions of democracy, the author of this paper poses the question whether discussing justice primarily from the social rather than the personal aspect and level is, perhaps, more appropriate. This ties in with the question of the primary object of justice – is justice the trait of social institutions or individuals? Thus the question of what kind of justice matches democracy. The author explicates this network of questions through three underlying models of the theory of justice – Plato, Aristotle and Rawls’s model. Plato’s model is about the realisation of a good life in a political community in view of the idea of justice that one should do that which is proper to one. Aristotle’s understanding of justice sets forth from a systematic analysis of the concepts that differentiate between the levels of general and particular justice. Rawls’s model of distributive justice rests on the mechanism of the forces of the institutional functional frameworks in well-organised societies. The author’s conclusion is that both forms of justice correspond well to the realisation of democracy. It is best when one’s personal disposition to justice provides strength and support to the social institutions of democracy. Without an adequate institutional framework there is, most certainly, no democracy. Without the personal support of citizens, which issues from fundamental consent, democracy can neither be sustained nor developed. In a democratic system, the private sphere of citizens cannot be fully separated from their public actions. Democracy always and necessarily contains in itself some of the political ideals, which citizens cannot, in their worldviews, relate to neutrally. The questions of the institutional and political shaping of relations, and the questions of the good and just life should be in the interest of the citizens. If they do not accomplish their democratic ideals through their own belief and virtue, then there is no substance that would shape identity for a just system of social institutions. If they do not relate to it as to their own common sense and good to be preserved, democracy has no prospects

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