Abstract

It is widely believed that, if human behaviour is subject to universal causation, people cannot be responsible for their actions. However, the excuses that are normally accepted do not invoke causation, so they would still be limited in scope even if all action had causal antecedents. Diminished responsibility due to (temporary or permanent) mental defect does involve reference to causation, but not to the fact of causation — rather, to the kind of causation. Again, therefore, universal causation does not threatenresponsibility in the cases in which we currently hold people responsible. Nevertheless, the fact that human beings are not radically self-determining does have implications.For it means that people cannot be held responsible for not doing things that are beyond their powers. If we combine this with the ethical principle that people should not suffer as a result of things for which they are not responsible, we can derive the conclusion that many existing inequalities cannot be justified