The normativity of perception and the perception of normativity

Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Imagine holding a cone of mint chocolate chip ice cream on a hot day. As you eye the ice cream, you see that it’s melting. If you don’t act quickly, you’ll wind up with sticky hands. Now pause this scene and ask yourself, ‘What should I do?’ The answer seems obvious: you should lick the melting ice cream. To say why this answer seems so reasonable, we need to say something about the normativity of perception. Perception, after all, is what tells you that the ice cream is melting. But we might also say something about the perception of normativity. Perception might also tell you that the ice cream calls for a lick. According to this latter story, perception doesn’t just tell you what to believe, it tells you what to do. I defend a version of this story in my dissertation. Ultimately I argue that charged experience is a source of immediate justification for normative beliefs. Such experiences are characterized by a feeling of being called to respond. The melting ice cream, for example, calls for a lick. Drawing upon phenomenological analyses of such cases, I argue that felt calls are reflected in the contents of charged experiences. Charged experiences have normative contents; they present certain considerations as reasons to respond in specific ways. According to this story, the belief that you should lick the melting ice cream is reasonable because charged experience tells you that you have reason to do so. Charged experience is thus a form of normative perception.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Nature of Legal Normativity, 37 Revus 83-91 (2019).Brian Bix - 2019 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 37:83-91.
Affordances and the Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 39-76.
Are affordances normative?Manuel Heras-Escribano & Manuel de Pinedo - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):565-589.
Responding to Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Clarendon Press. pp. 220--39.
Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
Was Kant a nonconceptualist?Hannah Ginsborg - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77.
Reasons and Perception.Declan Smithies - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 631-661.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-07-06

Downloads
12 (#1,089,546)

6 months
3 (#983,674)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthias Barker
University of Cincinnati

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references