Hybrid Theories of Moral Statements

In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell (2013)
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Abstract

Hybrid theories are metaethical theories concerning the content of sentences about moral value. These theories claim that sentences with ethical content express two kinds of mental state. One state is an affect‐like state. The other is a belief‐like state. The expressed affect‐like state will involve a moral attitude of some kind, such as approval, but it is not part of the truth‐conditions of the sentence. We can divide hybridists into two kinds.

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Stephen Barker
Nottingham University

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