Abstract
In Principia Ethica Moore expresses his great admiration for Brentano's ethical writings, and a comparison between Moore and Brentano reveals that their ethical theories have much in common. But they disagree fundamentally on the metaphysics of intrinsic value. Moore adopts an abstract realist position, whereas Brentano interprets intrinsic value by reference to “correct love” : that which is good is that which merits correct love. Brentano's position has many advantages over that of Moore ; but it raises the question as to what it is for love to be “correct”. Brentano simply relies on our experience at this point, comparing our experience of the evidence of certain judgements with our experience of the correctness of certain loves. But this no longer seems tenable. I suggest that one might try to construct an alternative account of “correct love” by drawing on other themes from Moore : his “defence of common Sense” and his thesis of the “supervenience” of the moral on the natural ; but I conclude that it is difficult to see how such an alternative account can be completed without some understanding of the general reliability of our natural sentiments, and that such an account seems bound to lead in the direction of the kind of ethical naturalism which Brentano repudiated.