An Interpretation and Assessment of First-person Authority in the Writings of Philosopher Donald Davidson

(2003)
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Abstract

In An Interpretation and Assessment of First-Person Authority in the Writings of Philosopher Donald Davidson, first-person authority is the thesis that subjects have a non-evidence-based form of epistemic warrant for self-ascriptions of psychological concepts that does not attach to a third-person evidence-based ascriptions of the same concepts.

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Eivind Balsvik
University of Oslo

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Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation.Eivind Balsvik - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):311-329.

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