Abstract

The claim that the epistemic status of a belief corresponds to the reliability of the process by which it was formed is developed and defended. In the course of this, a variety of conceptual and methodological matters are addressed. Notably, the role of the sciences, particularly experimental psychology and cognitive science, in epistemology is explored, and the claim that factual disciplines can have no bearing upon a normative project is considered and rejected. Also, the suggestion that psychology should entirely replace epistemology is considered and rejected. Although an internalist element is present in our concept of justification, it is argued that this should be dropped; it does not fit well with the general character of epistemic justification, it is linked with an unacceptable notion of justification, and empirical data reveal that placing internalist constraints on justification would draw the justified/unjustified line in a place at odds with the general character of Internalism. A variety of externalist forms of Reliabilism are examined, and Process Reliabilism is found to be the leading candidate. A position of this sort is developed, using recent work from cognitive science in working out an account of belief-forming, -maintaining, and -revising processes. Serious difficulties with standard approaches to determining reliability are pointed out, and novel approaches are explored. Finally, this theory is defended against traditional anti-reliabilist arguments and applied to traditionally difficult cases. It is shown that the usual arguments have no force against this formulation, and that visual, deductive, inferential, and mathematical beliefs can be handled quite well