Philosophy of Mind and/as the Repression of Interpersonal Understanding

In Joel Backström, Hannes Nykänen, Niklas Toivakainen & Thomas Wallgren (eds.), Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 231-266 (2019)
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Abstract

This chapter argues that traditional philosophy of mind turns on misrepresenting the I-you-relationship as a subject-object-relationship. This leads to interminable paradox and makes accounting for interpersonal understanding, the heart of human intelligibility, impossible. Detailing the absurdity of inferentialist accounts of understanding others, I show how this understanding is an essentially moral matter, that is, in itself a form of openness to and engaged caring for the other. For example, the very perception of suffering as suffering is already a form of compassion. Failures to act compassionately and, more generally, apparent failures to understand others, are forms of repressing one’s own caring-understanding, rather than mere absences of understanding. The confused subject-object-perspective in philosophy arises from and mirrors the moral-existential confusion in everyday life created through repression.

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Joel Backström
University of Helsinki

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