The Dialectics of Objectivity

Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (3):339-368 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper develops under-recognized connections between moderate historicist methodology and character (or virtue) epistemology, and goes on to argue that their combination supports a “dialectical” conception of objectivity. Considerations stemming from underdetermination problems motivate our claim that historicism requires agent-focused rather than merely belief-focused epistemology; embracing this point helps historicists avoid the charge of relativism. Considerations stemming from the genealogy of epistemic virtue concepts motivate our claim that character epistemologies are strengthened by moderate historicism about the epistemic virtues and values at work in communities of inquiry; embracing this point helps character epistemologists avoid the charge of objectivism.

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Guy Axtell
Radford University

References found in this work

Understanding and the facts.Catherine Elgin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42.
Trustworthiness.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
Problems for virtue theories in epistemology.Robert Lockie - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.

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