Intending, intentional action, and desire

In Joel Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting. Precedent. pp. 17--38 (1986)
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Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
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Desires.Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):267-302.
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